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The Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Process: A Prenegotiation Perspective 
Amira Schiff 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, I explore the prenegotiation process between Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), which extended over eight months in 1993 and ended with 
the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September of that year. During this 
period, the parties committed to recognize each other and conduct future negotiations with 
the aim of ending a century of conflict. The DOP was considered a significant breakthrough 
in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Scholars of Conflict Resolution typically view the discussions 
that led to the DOP as a positive example of how antagonists in ethno-national conflicts 
begin a course of constructive dialogue and conciliation. Applying prenegotiation theory, I 
question this assumption and argue that the prenegotiation process that took place between 
January and August 1993 leading the parties to commit to official negotiations and sign the 
DOP was in fact no more than a means of conflict management adjusting to contemporary 
circumstances. The research will uncover the factors that brought the leaders of both parties 
to consider negotiation and move towards accepting it as the best option at their disposal. I 
explore the functions that the prenegotiation performed and discuss how both parties failed 
to ensure that the necessary prenegotiation functions of the process were exhausted. Thus, my 
analysis indicates that the failure of the Oslo process, which began with the signing of the 
DOP, was inherent in the process's flawed basis. 
 
Introduction 
The basic premise of the “process school” in the conflict resolution (CR) field – that 
effective execution of the prenegotiation stage functions is critical for successful negotiations 
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(Zartman 2000)– highlights the importance of studying the prenegotiation process (which 
initially brings the parties to the negotiating table) in failed negotiations. Understanding the 
prenegotiation process can be particularly important because official negotiations between 
parties in ethno-national conflicts often reach a deadlock, and in retrospect, the parties’ 
consent to sit together at the negotiating table cannot be considered more than a technical 
achievement. Nevertheless, and despite the vast literature that discusses the factors 
influencing parties’ willingness to negotiate (Zartman 1985, 1989, 1996, 1999; Stein 1989; 
Tomlin 1989; Pruitt 1997, 2005a, 2005b, 2007), only a few scholars have studied the 
characteristics of prenegotiation in specific case studies (e.g., Stein 1989; Tomlin 1989). 
Moreover, even fewer attempts have been made to empirically study and assess the success 
of the prenegotiation process in bringing about strategic changes in the parties’ beliefs and 
expectations of one another and of the negotiation process itself (Schiff 2008).    
This study explores the prenegotiation process between Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), which extended over eight months in 1993 and ended with 
the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September of that year. During this 
period, the parties committed to recognize each other and conduct future negotiations with 
the aim of terminating a century of conflict.  For the first time in Israeli-Arab negotiations, 
the DOP noted the PLO as Israel’s partner for negotiation over the future of the Palestinian 
people. Indeed, the DOP was considered a significant breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian 
relations (Bercovitch 1997; Kelman 1997b; Pruitt 1997). Scholars of CR typically view the 
discussions that led to the DOP as a positive example of how parties to ethno-national 
conflicts begin a course of constructive dialogue and conciliation (Kelman 1997b; 1998). In 
the present research, I question this assumption by arguing that the prenegotiation process 
that took place between January and August 1993 and led to the signing of the DOP was no 
more than a means of conflict management adjusting to contemporary circumstances. I 
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illustrate this contention by investigating the unofficial process that ultimately led the parties 
to commit to official negotiations and sign the DOP. I examine this process first by 
uncovering the factors bringing both parties’ leaders to consider negotiation and move 
towards accepting it as the best option at their disposal.  I then explore the functions that the 
prenegotiation performed and discuss how both parties failed to ensure that the necessary 
prenegotiation functions of the process were exhausted. Thus, my analysis indicates that the 
failure of the Oslo process, which began with the signing of the DOP, was inherent in the 
process’s flawed basis. 
The basic premise of this study is that prenegotiation achievement in bringing the 
parties to the negotiation table does not necessarily reflect a strategic change in the parties’ 
perceptions and their belief in the feasibility of a mutually acceptable settlement. At times, 
the parties’ agreement to enter negotiation should be viewed as merely a technical 
accomplishment of the prenegotiation stage.  Moreover, based on the assertion expressed in 
the literature that effective execution of the prenegotiation stage functions is critical for 
successful negotiations, I suggest that a systematic analysis of the factors that contribute to 
the parties’ decision to initiate official negotiations – including their motives and the 
functions of the prenegotiation process – may help identify indications of a genuine strategic 
change in the parties’ political attitudes at the conclusion of the prenegotiation process. Such 
analysis may shed light on whether by agreeing to negotiate, the parties in fact embarked on a 
new path leading to win-win conflict resolution, or whether their agreement was merely 
tactical.  
Given the importance prenegotiation theory attaches to effective performance of the 
prenegotiation functions in affecting the ultimate success of negotiations, I argue that the 
prenegotiation stage should be considered the foundation of the entire negotiation process; 
thus, its proper construction is critical for the negotiation to end in agreement. Clearly, 
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however, even if the prenegotiation stage proceeds as planned, negotiations may still fail, due 
to inefficient management of the bargaining process or failure to implement the agreement. 
Furthermore, I do not contend that negotiations should be avoided when elements in the 
prenegotiation are identified as presaging potential problems that may emerge at a later stage 
in the process. Rather, the aim of this study is to propose a mechanism of checks that may 
warn parties against adopting far-reaching concessions in a negotiation process that has a 
poor chance of success.  
The article consists of three main sections. First, I present a review of the literature on 
pre-negotiations, followed by a brief description of the study’s methodology.  The next 
section discusses the case study of the Oslo Process’ prenegotiation phase, providing a brief 
background and analysis of Oslo and specifically addressing the factors underlying the 
leaders’ agreement to negotiate, the functions of the prenegotiation process, and the changes 
that occurred in the parties’ perceptions of the conflict. Finally, I present the conclusions 
drawn from the findings to sharpen our understanding of the role of the prenegotiation 
process.   
Theoretical Framework 
The basic assertions of the “process school” approach to conflict resolution serve as 
the starting point of this study, specifically: (1) negotiation is a problem-solving process 
comprised of several stages and turning points; (2) the different stages of the negotiation 
process are inter-related; and (3) the goal of the first stage of the process – the prenegotiation 
stage – is to trigger the parties to change their perceptions concerning the potential of arriving 
at a satisfactory solution through negotiations (Bercovitch 1991; Druckman 1986; Druckman 
and Hopmann 1989; Rothman 1991; Saunders 1999; Stein 1989; Tomlin 1989; Zartman 
1989, 1996; Zartman and Berman 1982).  
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Within the process approach, a sub-discipline focusing on prenegotiation developed, 
defining the stage as a complex process that begins with changes in at least one of the parties’ 
perceptions of the situation. This change allows the parties to consider conflict resolution 
through negotiations as an alternative to unilateral action. The prenegotiation stage 
commences when the parties consider the negotiation option and signal to each other 
intentions to negotiate. The phase culminates with the parties’ agreement to initiate official 
negotiations or, alternatively, with at least one party’s abandonment of the negotiations 
option (Zartman 1989). At the conclusion of the prenegotiation, the parties should reach a 
“turning point of seriousness” (Zartman and Berman 1982, 87), when they come to perceive 
each other as serious about finding a negotiated solution and view their opponents as willing 
to make some compromises in order to achieve their interests. 
Before further elaborating on the functions that prenegotiation performs in order to 
assist the parties in reaching the “turning point of seriousness,” we must first consider a more 
initial attribute of establishing a negotiation process: the factors that trigger the parties to 
consider the negotiation.  Process school scholars originally focused on the contextual 
conditions that prompt parties to consider and agree to negotiation (Zartman and Berman 
1982; Zartman 1985, 1989, 1996, 1999; Stein 1989; Tomlin 1989).  Researchers offer vast 
discussions of the factors that influence parties’ willingness to negotiate (Zartman 1985, 
1989, 1996, 1999; Stein 1989; Tomlin 1989; Pruitt 1997, 2005a, 2005b, 2007). Zartman’s 
“ripeness theory” is one of the first and the most comprehensive efforts to deal with this issue 
by highlighting the connection between the contextual conditions of prenegotiation and the 
successful inauguration of negotiations (1985, 1996, 2000, 2001), and thus warrants 
elaboration. Ripeness theory outlines the necessary (albeit insufficient) conditions that lead 
parties to consider and choose negotiation over unilateral action (Zartman 1985, 2000, 2001). 
According to this theory, the timing is right for productive negotiations to begin when the 
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following three elements exist, in descending order of importance: first, the perception of a 
mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), “optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently 
avoided catastrophe” (Zartman 2000, 228); second, the perception of a “way out” (Zartman 
2000, 228); and third, the presence of a valid spokesman for each side (Zartman 2000, 235). 
The first two elements are perceptual, while the third is structural. Both parties should 
demonstrate all three elements (but not necessarily to the same extent) in order for them to be 
ready for constructive negotiation. Beyond ripeness theory, other factors that may lead parties 
to consider negotiation as indicated by Stein (1989) include recent or anticipated crisis, a 
paired perception of threat and opportunity, the promise of prenegotiation to reduce some of 
the risks associated with negotiation and anticipated benefits from the process that might be 
realized even if it does not culminate in agreement (Stein 1989, 247). 
Scholars of pre-negotiations claim that the prenegotiation stage is intended to change 
the beliefs and expectations of decision makers, thereby enabling them to consider options 
entailing negotiations and compromise. According to Zartman (1989) and Stein (1989), this 
essential change in beliefs and expectations must be the outcome of a successful 
prenegotiation stage, achieved through several functions during the prenegotiation process. 
Some functions involve substantial issues such as a joint exploration of risks and costs 
involved in agreement, a search for alternative resolution arrangements to be addressed by the 
parties during the negotiation, development of the understanding that negotiation concessions 
will be reciprocated by the other party, establishment of mechanisms that facilitate perceptual 
changes, and mobilization of domestic support for the settlement. Other functions, such as 
defining the agenda for negotiations or choosing representatives for the negotiation, are of a 
procedural nature.  
Prenegotiation theory asserts that during the prenegotiation, the parties should clarify 
the risks embodied in cooperation. Exchange of information reduces uncertainty and 
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consequently diminishes the perceived risks of concessions made as part of the joint effort. 
According to this theory, prenegotiation also allows the parties to assess and come to terms 
with the costs of the agreement and various concessions, as well as the cost of the failure of 
the process. During prenegotiation, the parties must generate alternative definitions of the 
problem, while retaining several alternative agreements for them to address in the official 
negotiations. Moreover, the parties must develop an understanding that the negotiations will 
involve mutual concessions and contemplate their future situation after mutual concessions 
are made. The process should also allow each party to assess and establish domestic support 
for a settlement, and to invest efforts to mobilize support for the settlement among the 
opponent’s public (Stein 1989; Zartman 1989).  
Furthermore, the parties should use the prenegotiation period to establish mechanisms 
that facilitate the desired perceptual change from a perception of a zero-sum conflict to a win-
win mentality. Such mechanisms may include a temporary suspension of hostilities in order 
to create a sense of security. The political psychology approach attributes special significance 
to prenegotiation actions designed to transform the adversarial relationship (Kelman 1997a), 
with emphasis on a strategy of “mutual responsiveness” (Kelman 1997a) to the concerns of 
the other party through mutual exploration of needs and fears. The key element in such 
strategies is mutual reassurance, which includes mutual recognition, mutual gestures, and 
actions that build mutual trust by addressing the parties’ respective needs and concerns 
(Kelman 1997a). Finally, the agenda and the resolution boundary limits should be defined in 
the prenegotiation stage. This process reduces the negotiation process’s uncertainty and risks. 
Ultimately, noting these issues, scholars emphasize that execution of prenegotiation functions 
is crucial for negotiation success, as Zartman contends: “Unless the uncertainties covered by 
these…functions of prenegotiation are reduced, negotiations…cannot begin and cannot come 
to a conclusion” (1996, 275).   
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Methodology 
In this research, I employ an enhanced case study method for interpretive and 
analytical purposes (Druckman 2005, 167). The exploration of the factors underlying the 
decisions of Israel and the PLO to enter negotiations on September 13, 1993 through the lens 
of prenegotiation theory expands our understanding of the path leading to signing of the 
DOP.  I address the changes in the leaders’ preferences concerning an agreement in the 
prenegotiation period and the factors underlying such changes or the absence thereof. I 
review the strategic and internal factors that led each party to implement certain strategies in 
the prenegotiation stage and examine whether the parties’ political commitment to official 
negotiations was merely a tactical change or constituted what Zartman and Berman (1982) 
would call a “turning point of seriousness” in their perceptions of each other and the 
negotiation process.  Specifically, I explore the factors leading to Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin’s decision to abandon his former position and initiate direct negotiations with 
the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Did Rabin’s agreement to negotiate 
with the PLO as an official negotiating partner imply a change in his conceptualization of the 
conflict and the issues involved? Did the talks in Oslo lead to a change in Rabin's perception 
of his adversary, leading him to view PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat as a potential partner in 
the process who is worthy of some degree of trust? I also address the factors that led Yasser 
Arafat to agree to the DOP, whose provisions constituted a substantial departure from the 
principles he previously propounded.  
Clearly, the process leading to the DOP’s signing was characterized by some unique 
features. However, it shares the following common attributes with other ethno-national 
conflicts in which the peace process reached a deadlock and therefore can serve as an 
example of the application of those concepts (Druckman 2005, 167): the conflict is protracted 
and intractable, characterized by asymmetric power relations between a state (Israel) and a 
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non-state actor (the PLO) representing an ethnic group with national aspirations; and similar 
to other ethno-national conflicts, the issue of non-recognition played a major role in both 
parties’ unwillingness to reach a settlement for many years. Based on these common features, 
this specific case can help us gain a better understanding of the dynamics taking place during 
such prenegotiations and their implications regarding strategic changes in the parties’ 
perceptions and willingness to negotiate a “wise agreement” (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991) 
not only in future negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but also in similar 
ethno-national conflicts. 
The research involved a qualitative content analysis of various sources, including 
speeches, declarations, written records of the events of figures who took part in the process, 
media and personal interviews, and media coverage of the events. 
Case Study:  Arriving at the Declaration of Principles (DOP) 
Background 
In Israel’s 13th Knesset (Israeli Parliament) election campaign, Yitzhak Rabin pledged 
to change national priorities and reach an autonomy agreement with the Palestinians within 
six to nine months. His election platform also created Palestinian expectations that the Labor 
party’s rise to power would lead to a change in the Israeli position on negotiations with the 
Palestinians and with the PLO. After Rabin’s victory in the June 1992 elections, the PLO 
leadership called on the new government in Israel to begin direct discussions to promote the 
peace process, which had been caught in an impasse, but these calls went unanswered. Rabin 
believed that Israel should not negotiate with the PLO, but rather preferred to negotiate 
Palestinian autonomy with a delegation of the local leadership of the Territories, regardless of 
who their advisors might be. Despite the Israeli change of government and Israel’s awareness 
of the window of opportunity for progress toward peace, the parties retained their 
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fundamental conflicting positions during the Washington talks held towards the end of 1992 
and blamed the failure of these talks on each other (Shlaim 1994).  
In early January 1993, a group of Israeli individuals including Yair Hirschfeld and 
Ron Pundak, headed by Yossi Beilin, then Deputy Foreign Minister, promoted a direct 
dialogue with PLO officials through secret, unofficial dialogue in Norway. They understood 
that direct talks with PLO leadership in Tunis were the only way to break through the 
impasse of the Washington talks (Beilin 1997). This unofficial channel was intended as a 
platform for joint explorations of how to overcome the problems in the Washington 
discussions. In the first months of the dialogue, Rabin only reluctantly agreed to the talks 
(Peres 1995) and prohibited Israeli participants from confirming that he supported the talks 
(Beilin 1997).  During the eight months of dialogue, the parties formed a commitment to 
recognize each other and conduct future negotiations. The exchange of recognition letters 
between Arafat and Rabin on the September 9, 1993, facilitated the signing of the Declaration 
of Principles on September 13, 1993 (Ministry of Education and Culture 1993)   
Analysis: Factors Underlying the Leaders’ Agreement to Negotiate 
Rabin’s decision to conduct negotiations with the PLO as the representative of the 
Palestinians resulted from the elimination of other alternatives during the period between 
January 1993 and September 1993 against the backdrop of the failing Washington talks and 
growing perceptions of risk. After his election in June 1992, Rabin – a realist whose position 
was considered hawkish by his own Labor party – viewed the achievement of peace during 
his administration as a means to obtain the supreme national priority of security for the State 
of Israel (Inbar 1999). In this period, Rabin’s perception of an acceptable agreement was 
comprised of five main conditions, as follows: signing an agreement with the local leadership 
of the Territories (and not with the PLO, which was perceived as an extremely adverse 
factor); reaching a settlement in two stages; opposing the establishment of an independent 
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Palestinian state, which Rabin viewed as a significant security threat; maintaining sovereignty 
over a united Jerusalem; and ruling out Israel’s retreat to pre-June 1967 borders (Agid-Ben 
Yehuda and Auerbach 1991; Die Welt 1993; Inbar 1999; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1992; Rabin 1995). Yet despite his reluctance to do so, five main factors drove Rabin to agree 
to negotiate with the PLO as the Palestinian representative:  
A Sense of Impending Crisis or Catastrophe Caused by a Third Party  
 The perception of an existential threat from Iran was heightened in the summer of 
1993, with the failure of both the talks with the Palestinians in Washington and the talks with 
Syria (Aluf 1993; Inbar 1999; Ross 2004).  
A Dual Perception of Opportunity and Threat  
The inability to break through the stalemate in the Washington talks following the 
Hamas activists’ deportation from Gaza to Lebanon in December 1992 was a turning point 
for Rabin who, in contrast to his election promise of a “year of peace,” was no longer certain 
of the ability of the Israeli delegation to Washington to reach an agreement with the 
Palestinians within the desired timeframe (Al-Hayat 1992; Beilin 1997; Die Welt 1993; 
Makovsky 1996; Shalev 1993; Time Magazine 1992). Nevertheless, at this point, Rabin 
viewed the Oslo talks as an opportunity to renew the deadlocked Washington talks, to which 
he attributed high priority (Beilin 1997; Peres 1995).  
Perceptions of a Hurting Stalemate and Impending Catastrophe  
Rabin’s perceptions of a hurting stalemate and an impending catastrophe drove him to 
urgently seek a way out of the impasse in Washington. Rabin’s perception of terror being an 
urgent issue reached a climax in March 1993, when the wave of murderous acts by 
Palestinians peaked and exacerbated the sense of personal danger perceived by Rabin and by 
the Israeli public (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993a, 1993b; Rabin 1995; Shalev 
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1993). Rabin’s fear of an impending catastrophe was reinforced by the growing influence of 
the Hamas, an extremist organization, in the Territories.  
Internal Ripeness  
In the first months of his term in office, Rabin’s “win-set” (Putnam 1993, 439) 
changed, as manifested in a government bill that permitted meetings between private citizens 
and PLO representatives, as well as in public opinion polls, which indicated the Israeli 
public’s growing tolerance of the idea of direct negotiations with the PLO. Towards July 
1993, Rabin’s “win set” expanded significantly, when members of the Labor and Meretz 
parties demanded a revision of Israel’s position on negotiations with the PLO in view of the 
impasse in the Washington talks. These changes found expression in Rabin’s revised 
strategies toward the PLO in late July and early August 1993 because they matched Rabin’s 
own threat perceptions (personal communication, Haber 2003). Failure of the tenth round of 
talks in Washington in July 1993 reinforced Rabin’s steadfast belief that Arafat intended to 
prevent any progress in Washington in his absence (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993c; 
Peres 1995, 298).  In view of the threat to Israel, as Rabin perceived it, and the impasse in the 
Washington talks, some breakthrough in the Palestinian or Syrian option appeared essential. 
The Syrian option, however, had failed (Lesch Mosely 1995, 111–128; Ross 2004, 109-111).  
In mid-August 1993, yet another factor contributed to “internal ripeness” (Mitchell 
1996, 12), as Rabin felt mounting pressure to achieve an agreement with the Palestinians as 
quickly as possible (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993c; Peres 1995, 298). His party 
was about to leave the coalition; as a result, any governmental decision on cardinal security 
issues, including an agreement with the PLO, would be more difficult to achieve (Beilin 
1997, 133).  
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Devising a Way Out through Oslo 
Rabin’s decision to send Uri Savir, Director General of the Foreign Ministry, to Oslo 
in May 1993 was driven by the perceptions discussed above and by the success of the Oslo 
talks in generating a draft agreement (Peres 1995, 295). Yet Rabin maintained his low 
expectations of the Oslo option, and Savir’s involvement simply formed part of Rabin’s 
intent to explore the option of negotiations (Amit 2003, 40; Beilin 1997, 104, 109, 111; Peres 
1995, 295). Rabin’s agreement to pursue the Oslo talks by sending his confidante, Joel 
Zinger, in mid-June 1993, significantly contributed to Rabin’s understanding that Oslo had 
become a serious option (Hirschfeld 2000, 127; Zinger 1998).  Nevertheless, at that point, 
despite Zinger’s progress, Rabin still clung to his hopes that an agreement between the Israeli 
and Palestinian delegations would be signed in Washington (Beilin 1997, 119-121). 
Developed against the backdrop of the failure of the tenth round of talks in 
Washington and the crisis in the Oslo negotiations in late July, the secret talks conducted 
between mid-July and mid-August through Haim Ramon – one of the ministers closest to 
Rabin – and Ahmad Tibbi – Arafat’s emissary and political advisor – significantly 
contributed to Rabin’s conclusion that it was possible to make a deal with Arafat on behalf of 
the Palestinians (Ramon 2004). Rabin, who was suspicious of Peres and his confidants in 
Oslo, utilized this channel as a direct and profound means to explore Arafat’s intentions in 
formulating the emerging agreement (Ramon 2004). Rabin would not commit to signing the 
document until he was convinced that the PLO was willing to make the necessary 
concessions in accordance with Israel's interests. Indeed, following the Ramon-Tibbi 
contacts, Rabin reached what Zartman and Berman (1982) coined the “turning point of 
seriousness.”  
In light of the perceived threats and the emerging understanding with Arafat through 
the Oslo and Ramon-Tibi channel, Rabin assessed that the consequences of failure to sign the 
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DOP were worse than those of reaching an agreement with the PLO. Referring to an 
agreement with the PLO, Rabin stated, “I must look at the general picture; we have no other 
alternative” (Tal 1993). Furthermore, Rabin assumed that a breakthrough with the 
Palestinians that involved no territorial concessions in the interim stage would lead to a 
resolution of the Israel-Arab conflict and a breakthrough with the Arab bloc headed by Syria 
(Barnea and Shifer 1993). 
In conjunction with the changes that led Rabin to agree to direct talks with the PLO, a 
parallel process was taking place on the Palestinian side that led Arafat to decide upon 
engaging in negotiation during that period. Prior to the summer of 1993, Arafat’s position 
represented both the PLO and the majority of the Palestinian population of the Territories. 
Starting in the summer of 1992, Arafat called on Rabin to enter into a “peace of the brave” 
(Ashrawi 1995, 184; Rosenblum,  Nir, and  Eldar 1993), based on UN Resolutions 242 and 
338, which call for the exchange of land for peace; the right of return, self-determination and 
an independent Palestinian state, as part of a just solution to the Palestinian problem; 
acknowledgement of Jerusalem as the capital of the independent Palestinian state; a clear 
linkage between the interim agreements and the final stage, including the permanent 
settlement and establishment of an independent Palestinian state; elections for a legislative 
council with broad administrative and legislative authority and recognition of the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinian nation in negotiations with Israel. Arafat was driven in the 
process by two main perceptions: a perceived threat due to failed policies and a perception of 
opportunity. The perceived threat emanated from failed policies resulting from several 
factors, namely:  
Declining Eco-Political Status of the PLO 
 In 1992, the PLO was in a dire financial position (Heikal 1996, 428-431; Rubin 1994, 
193). In the summer of 1993, the PLO’s financial and political position took another turn for 
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the worse. The PLO sank into millions of dollars of debt, while internal protest rose within 
the organization regarding its difficult financial situation, the problematic economic situation 
in the Territories, and the Palestinian negotiating policy with the Israelis. In addition, Arafat’s 
leadership was increasingly threatened by the Hamas, which had opposed Palestinian 
participation in the Madrid process from the beginning and now exploited the lack of 
progress in the Washington talks to reinforce its own position in the Territories (Gowers and 
Walker 1994, 500). Moreover, in late 1993, the organization risked losing its base in Tunis.   
Threats to Personal Safety and Leadership Status 
After approximately twenty months of negotiations, criticism from within the PLO 
increased, targeting Arafat’s leadership per se (Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near 
East and South Asia:FBIS-NES-93-153; FBIS-NES-93-166). Arafat’s sense of urgency was 
also fed by his fear for his personal safety. In the early 1990s, Israel assassinated several PLO 
leaders who were close to Arafat. Unwelcomed in Arab countries and fearful for his life, 
Arafat lived as a fugitive (Aburish 1998, 232-233). 
Failure of the Talks in Washington and Other Channels to the Rabin Government  
Arafat’s frustration grew with the lack of any significant change in the Israeli position 
in the Washington talks. Furthermore, all of Arafat’s attempts to initiate unofficial channels 
with Israel under the auspices of Cairo or Europe proved to be ineffective (Abbas 1995, 92; 
Heikal 1996, 433). 
Perception of Hurting Stalemate 
The conditions in the Territories worsened as time passed. The Palestinians’ situation 
appeared to be bleak (Abbas 1995, 95). Arafat’s statements from that time onward clearly 
reflected disappointment, despair, and a sense of urgency. The perception of a hurting 
stalemate was highlighted by the failure of the tenth round of talks in Washington, in June 
1993 (FBIS-NES-93-124; FBIS-NES-93-177).  
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Yet beyond these circumstances, Arafat also demonstrated that he perceived an 
opportunity that emerged from the dialogue taking place during this period.  The Oslo 
channel proved itself to be different from all the other informal channels that Arafat had 
attempted to use to communicate with Rabin. Arafat’s sense of opportunity increased as the 
Oslo talks progressed (Abbas 1995, 114).  In late July 1993, the perception of opportunity 
became a major motive underlying Arafat’s actions when two key issues were added to the 
agenda in the Oslo track: the establishment of the PLO leadership in the Gaza Strip (Peres 
1995, 286-288; Savir 1998, 56; Zinger 1998) and Israel’s recognition of the PLO as a partner 
in the negotiations, on the condition that the organization make certain concessions toward 
Israel and its position (Zinger 1998). Arafat’s fierce desire to fortify his status and the PLO’s 
control over the Palestinian territories when Israel withdrew from Gaza and Jericho was a 
major motivating factor in his signing the DOP (Savir 1998, 56). And as Mahmoud Abbas 
noted in his memoirs, it appears that Arafat considered the remaining details of the agreement 
to be of secondary importance (Abbas 1995, 202).   
The Ramon-Tibbi exchange played a significant role in leading Arafat to sign the 
DOP. Through this channel, Arafat sought Rabin’s personal confirmation of the ideas 
discussed in the Oslo talks (Abbas 1995, 156). Following this exchange, Arafat reached a 
“turning point of seriousness” (Zartman and Berman 1982), realizing that there was a way out 
of the stalemate.   
Two other elements exacerbated Arafat’s decision in early August 1993 to agree to 
the proposed formula. First, Arafat received a signal from Peres, indicating that Israel 
believed that the negotiations had been exhausted (FBIS-NES-93-169).  Second, Arafat 
understood that if he failed to make a deal with Israel very quickly, he might be left behind 
while Jordan, Lebanon and Syria make progress toward understandings with Israel (Savir 
1998, 72). Thus, Arafat consented to sign the DOP with Israel when his options were reduced 
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to a single course of action – agreement (Heikal 1996, 463).  Under these circumstances, in 
early August, Arafat instructed the Washington delegation to show more flexibility in its 
positions by accepting the concept of “Gaza and Jericho first” and agreeing to postpone 
discussions on Jerusalem to the future negotiations on a permanent status agreement.  
Ultimately, the perception of a hurting stalemate in the parties’ relationship was of 
secondary importance to Arafat’s agreement to the DOP, as analysis of statements by Arafat 
and the responses of the Palestinian members of the Washington delegation indicates 
(Ashrawi 1995, 259-260).  In his public statements, Arafat tended to emphasize the 
distressful situation of the population in the Territories, but his statements in inner-circle 
discussions in the prenegotiation stage clearly reflected his concern over the organization's 
status and his own status as the leader of the Palestinian people (FBIS-NES-93-175; FBIS-
NES-93-163). Furthermore, the criticism Territory representatives to the Washington talks 
hurled at Arafat and his actions reflected the problematic considerations that drove PLO 
leadership to sign the agreement. Ashrawi (1995, 260) has argued that by consenting to 
articles of the DOP in Oslo, PLO representatives disregarded the issues that were genuinely 
important for the population in the Territories, and instead responded to the inter-
organizational political and economic pressure to which they were subject. 
The Functions of the Pre-Negotiation Process 
The following analysis indicates that the Oslo prenegotiation failed to perform its 
critical functions.  
Risks Assessment and Exploration of the Costs of Negotiation 
It appears that no real exploration of the risks and costs involved in agreement took 
place in the Oslo prenegotiation process. The Israeli side in the Oslo talks conducted no 
discussions or systematic analysis of future events (Barnea and Shifer 1993; Rahat and 
Bofman 1993) and ignored the cost implications of the agreement. On one hand, Rabin 
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insisted that any understanding with the Palestinians be based on a phased process 
comprising two independent stages. On the other hand, Rabin – who was eager to reach an 
interim settlement that would put an end to what he felt was the country’s deplorable 
situation – seemed to have repressed the implications of Palestinian compliance with the 
terms of the DOP, which would obligate Israel to discuss a permanent status agreement 
(Israeli Television 1995; Rabin 1995, 90, 97-98). Rabin was aware of the potential problems 
that could arise in the permanent status agreement negotiations; therefore, he decided to 
postpone discussions on these issues to the third year of the interim agreement, under the 
assumption that the disputes could be resolved with time (Rabin 1995, 90). Thus, the Israeli 
side preferred to blur the real implications of the issues that would be discussed as part of the 
permanent status agreement, and to present the prenegotiation agreement reached as if for 
Israel, all options remain open for the negotiation process to follow. Thus, for example, at 
the end of August, Rabin said that the DOP does not discuss a Palestinian State, but rather “it 
is about interim agreement for five years. Our opinion against a state is well known. Any 
attempt to connect the Interim agreement to the permanent Status agreement is nonsense” 
(Barnea 1993).  And while presenting the DOP at the Knesset, Rabin also said, “All issues 
connected to the permanent solution will be left to the negotiations that will take place two 
years after the date that was determined in the agreement, while preserving the freedom of the 
Israeli government to determine its stand regarding the shape of the permanent status 
agreement. This means that the DOP leaves all options open for us in this realm” (Rabin 
1995, 90). 
In contrast to the Israelis, the Palestinians accepted the DOP as an interim agreement 
in the hope of reaching the final status negotiations. By defining both the agenda and the 
time-line of the permanent status negotiations, the Palestinians believed that the DOP firmly 
connected the interim agreement and the permanent settlement (FBIS-NES-93-169; FBIS-
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NES-93-177; FBIS-NES-93-181). By the end of the prenegotiation, Arafat believed that the 
situation following the proposed agreement would be more favorable than the current one 
was, for both the Palestinians and himself. The agreement would allow Arafat to obtain what 
Israel is willing to concede in the present, without relinquishing the possible attainment of his 
goals, which remained unchanged, in the future (Ashrawi 1995, 259). 
Exploring the Alternatives and Defining the Problem 
The DOP prenegotiation process failed to produce a satisfactory joint redefinition of 
the problem. Saunders (1999, 100) notes that a joint definition of the problem is an essential 
condition for the success of negotiations. In his view, the manner in which policymakers 
define the problem to be discussed is the primary factor that affects how they deal with the 
problem. Although the parties to the Oslo process agreed regarding what would be discussed, 
their joint re-definition of the problems during the talks was minimal and failed to satisfy the 
parties’ most important needs. The Oslo process indicates that while a joint re-definition of a 
problem may be essential for the initiation of formal negotiations, the extent to which the 
redefinition of the problem offers an adequate solution to both parties’ needs significantly 
affects the success of the prenegotiation process in transforming the parties’ orientation 
toward resolution.  
At the onset and throughout the prenegotiation process, both parties maintained 
different definitions of the problem. For Arafat, the problem was two-fold: 1) Israel’s non-
recognition of the PLO as a partner to negotiations and as the sole representative of the 
Palestinian people. This problem was aggravated by the organization’s declining financial 
and political status; 2) Israel’s non-recognition of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination 
and to an independent state. Nevertheless, as the perceptions of threats grew in early 1991, 
the organization directed its efforts to resolving the first problem and gaining recognition as a 
partner to negotiations. In contrast, Rabin defined the problem in terms of perceived threats 
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described above, with no reference to either the recognition of the PLO or the establishment 
of a Palestinian state. Yet in late June 1993, he reframed the problem. The change involved 
an issue on which Rabin had been previously uncompromising. Rabin understood that 
recognition of the PLO as the Palestinian representative and reinforcement of Arafat’s status 
in the Territories were the most crucial points for Arafat (Heikal 1996, 471). Therefore, Israel 
offered its rapid evacuation of Gaza and Jericho and the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority, and placed the issue of recognition on the agenda in exchange for some flexibility 
on the part of Arafat.  
It appears that the parties managed to reach an agreement because they effectively 
appealed to one another’s interests by focusing on the minimal common denominator of the 
problem while intentionally, given the circumstances,  disregarding the substantial 
differences in their respective problem definitions, as well as their respective needs and 
perceptions of the preferred agreement. In Oslo, Arafat aimed to achieve the maximal tactical 
gain possible at the time and to implement the elements of the permanent settlement as soon 
as possible, while Rabin’s desire in these talks was to reach an agreement on a phased 
settlement that would allow him to carefully implement each stage at a time. Rabin hoped 
that a gradual implementation would eventually lead to the parties’ agreement on other 
elements of the permanent settlement. The perceptions of crisis that motivated the parties also 
led them, either consciously or unconsciously, to minimize their true differences (Heikal 
1996, 473). Still, after signing the DOP, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state 
formed a significant part of the definition of the problem for Arafat (Ashrawi 1995, 259). 
Rabin, however, remained unwilling to accept the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state. Instead, he supported the existence of a Palestinian entity – not an 
independent state – which covered only part of the territories that Israel held since 1967 (Kol 
Israel 1995a, 1995b).  Indeed, the minimal joint re-definition of the problem – the definition 
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that the parties agreed on, which enabled them to sign the DOP – actually preserved the 
dispute regarding many issues, and later became among the key stumbling blocks in the 
negotiations that commenced after the DOP was signed. As Saunders notes: “…if 
negotiations do begin, those holding widely different definitions of the problem will use 
delaying tactics in the negotiation as another instrument for blocking movement” (1999, 64). 
The Agenda 
Another important function of prenegotiation is determining a joint agenda for 
negotiations. Although the parties had agreed on an agenda, the subsequent negotiations 
reached an impasse because of the specific manner in which the agenda was defined. Indeed, 
the DOP restricted the negotiations agenda on the interim agreement. Discussion of disputed 
issues was postponed, presumably to reduce the risks involved in the commitment to 
negotiate. However, the issues that were excluded from the negotiating table were pivotal to 
the main interests and needs of the parties. These include, for example, the deferral of 
discussions on the permanent status agreement, Jerusalem and the refugees. In fact, these 
issues formed the main obstacles to the resolution of the conflict, which both parties defined 
as the goal of the entire process. Moreover, due to the constructive ambiguity (Bell and 
Cavanaugh 1999, 1356) in several sections of the DOP, even issues that were in fact agreed 
upon for inclusion in the agenda were formulated in an ambiguous manner. This strategy was 
pursued, for example, in applying UN Resolutions 242 and 338 to the refugee issue, in 
discussing the control over the border passages between Gaza and Egypt and between Jericho 
and Jordan, and in covering the issue of transportation from the two different Autonomous 
Territories (Beilin 1997: 128-129;   FBIS-NES-93-169; FBIS-NES-93-175; FBIS-NES-93-
177; Peres 1995: 293-294, 311-313; Tal 1993). Thus, the constructive ambiguity enabled the 
parties a space for different interpretations of the articles in the DOP. At this point in the 
conflict, the Israeli side needed an interim agreement that could be portrayed to the Israeli 
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public as a minimal costs agreement that brings it many advantages, while Arafat needed an 
agreement that would allow him reclaim his own importance and full political control while 
presenting some achievement that would be considered a breakthrough on the road to a 
Palestinian state. However, the advantages this technique held for the parties in enabling 
them to conclude the agreement ultimately backfired as they consequently impeded the 
negotiations on the interim agreement (Heikal 1996, 471, 473). Thus, it appears that even 
when conflicting parties agree to an agenda, it is important to identify the factors underlying 
the agenda and how both parties interpret the issues placed on the table (as well as those that 
were excluded). 
Establishing Mechanisms that Facilitate Perceptual Changes 
Defaults are also evident in prenegotiation elements that might have served to 
facilitate changes in perception and created paths to reconciliation. Arafat refused, during the 
prenegotiation phase, to order the cessation of the Intifada violent uprising (an essential 
interest for Rabin) or to assume responsibility for the violent acts of Palestinians who were 
not PLO members (FBIS-NES-93-169). Israel considered his position on this issue to be an 
endorsement of continued violence against its citizens undertaken by the Hamas and the 
Islamic Jihad – two organizations that later strove to undermine the fragile trust that was built 
between the parties in Oslo.  
Consolidating Internal Support for Negotiations 
 Arafat’s acceptance of the DOP implied a departure from what he, the PLO, and the 
Palestinian representatives from the Territories had previously perceived as an acceptable 
agreement with Israel. The DOP included no agreement on the structure of the Palestinian 
legislative council or other issues such as Jerusalem, Israel’s evacuation of the remainder of 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the right of return for 1967 refugees. Nevertheless, 
Arafat emphasized to his Palestinian and Arab audiences that the agreement did not represent 
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a significant change in the Palestinian position. After initializing the DOP, Arafat stressed 
that he viewed the “Gaza and Jericho first” settlement as the first step in implementing 
Resolutions 242 and 338, as part of his “take whatever you can” strategy; and that in the 
permanent status agreement, these resolutions would be fully realized and an independent 
Palestinian state would be established (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993b; Pinkas 
1993; Shahaf 1993).  Furthermore, the ambiguity inherent in several DOP clauses served 
Arafat’s interests effectively, as he himself noted: “The Israelis have the right to say whatever 
they want and we have the right to say whatever we want…” (FBIS-NES-93-154; FBIS-
NES-93-170).  In the short term, this strategy productively allowed Arafat and the PLO to 
mobilize public support for the DOP. In the long run, however, it was damaging to the peace 
process because the Palestinian public developed unrealistic expectations that exacerbated the 
parties’ distrust during the official negotiations.  
Rabin, on his part, took no steps to influence public support for negotiations with the 
PLO until the communications between Ramon and Tibbi clarified that Arafat was ready to 
show flexibility on the issues included in the DOP. However, from mid-August onward, 
Rabin’s statements were directed to change the Israeli public image of the PLO by 
representing the organization as a moderate and pragmatic element in the Arab world and a 
potential negotiating partner (Pinkas 1993; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993c). 
Exploring Reciprocity  
Finally, indications exist that Israel engaged in an inadequate exploration of 
reciprocity.  Rabin agreed to sign the DOP and recognize the PLO, while accepting as a given 
Arafat’s refusal to order the end of the Intifada or commit to a specific schedule for the 
amendment of certain articles of Palestinian National Covenant, as well as Arafat’s insistence 
on restricting the cessation of terror to the PLO.  The contents of Rabin’s conversation with 
Beilin dated August 22, 1993, following the initialization of the DOP, point in this direction.  
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Rabin asked if the agreement contained reference to the PLO’s renunciation of terror. When 
Beilin replied that it did not, Rabin said that it was inconceivable that Israel would sign an 
agreement with the PLO without the organization making a commitment to renounce terror 
(Barnea and Shifer 1993; Shahaf 1993). This raises the critical question: What made Rabin 
fail to confirm that Israel’s demands on this issue – which he perceived as Israel’s essential 
interest – would be met before signing the agreement?  
Prenegotiation Outcomes: Lack of Significant Change in Perceptions and Expectations 
The signing of the DOP and the mutual recognition represented the end of the 
prenegotiation. The DOP was meant to serve as a road map outlining the future negotiation 
that would bring about the final resolution of the conflict. The purpose of the Oslo 
prenegotiation process was to make the parties recognize that overlap might in fact be created 
in their respectively acceptable terms, where a zone of possible agreement can be found. 
Nevertheless, as described above, analysis of the prenegotiation functions indicates that the 
changes that Rabin and Arafat underwent regarding their respective acceptable terms of 
agreement and regarding each other were in fact rather minor. 
By the end of the prenegotiation, the only change in Rabin’s acceptable terms of 
agreement was his willingness to reach what he stressed to be “an understanding with 
Palestinian representatives from the Diaspora” (Barnea 1993). As indicated in the analysis, 
his agreement to accept the PLO as a negotiating partner at this stage reflected his evaluation 
that Israel was facing worse alternatives. Indeed, Rabin thought that the DOP better served 
the Israeli national interests than any alternative would. As Rabin put it: “I entered the 
process with a clear mind because the alternative is either to find a Palestinian partner with its 
limitations or, if the situation stayed as it is, the extremist elements would have gotten the 
upper hand and we wouldn’t have any chance for political solution” (Kol Israel 1995a). 
Although his dislike of the PLO remained firm (Tal 1993), Rabin now described the PLO as a 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 19, Number 1 85 
pragmatic organization with which a resolution of the conflict could be negotiated (Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993d; Israeli Television 1995). Yet Rabin remained realistic; his 
trust in the PLO and his expectations of the organization as a productive negotiating partner 
were limited (Barnea and Shifer 1993; Pinkas 1993; Rabin 1995: 86-90; Shahaf 1993). As 
Rabin phrased it a month after signing the DOP: “[The PLO is] committed to renounce 
terrorism… but, at this phase, I don't expect them to demonstrate such heroism. We know 
with whom we are dealing…” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993d).  
Moreover, aside from coming to view Arafat as a negotiating partner, Rabin clearly 
did not change his perception. Rabin took every opportunity to emphasize that although the 
DOP does include recognition of the PLO as a partner for talks and the evacuation of “Gaza 
and Jericho first,” it leaves the defence of the autonomy in Israel’s hands. Additionally, Rabin
noted that the DOP does not call for settlements to be evacuated and affirmed his continuing 
refusal to negotiate on Jerusalem and the refugees (Shahaf 1993). He also asserted that the 
DOP is in fact only an interim agreement and that any attempt to draw a connection between 
the interim agreement and the final status agreement is a farce.  
Arafat as well, apparently, did not experience any strategic changes in his terms of 
potential agreement through the process that led to the signing of the DOP. The terms he 
agreed to in endorsing the DOP and mutual recognition reflect no more than a brief diversion 
on route to an unwavering target. They were a means to create a breakthrough to reinforce his 
status as PLO leader and the status of his organization, as well as to break the impasse at the 
Washington negotiation. Despite the introduction of the DOP and the mutual recognition 
letters, the difficult issues in contention were postponed to future discussion in the framework 
of the permanent status negotiation. Indeed, on various occasions from August 1992 onward, 
Arafat emphasized to the Palestinian and Arab audiences that there was no substantive 
change in his approach. Thus, for example, after initialling the DOP, Arafat stressed that he 
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considered the “Gaza and Jericho first” agreement a start to the implementation of Security 
Council Decisions 242 and 338, while it is clear that the final status agreement’s outcome 
will be an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital (FBIS-NES-93-169; 
FBIS-NES-93-177, FBIS-NES-93-181).  In Arafat’s view, the DOP in fact served as 
implementation of the decision of the Palestinian National Council from 1974, which 
permitted the establishment of Palestinian Authority on every piece of land from which Israel 
will withdraw while the final goal remains constant: an independent Palestinian state (Bechor 
1993; FBIS-NES-93-169; FBIS-NES-93-170). This was clearly not what Rabin had in mind 
when he signed the DOP.  
Arafat continued to view the Israeli-Palestinian relationship as a zero-sum game 
(Heikal 1996, 473), with diplomacy being just one of several fronts on which the battle for 
independence was fought (Elmatzur 1993; FBIS-NES-93-156; FBIS-NES-93-175; FBIS-
NES-93-177; FBIS-NES-93-181; Pipes and Stillman 1995). He kept presenting any 
agreement with Israel as a temporary cease-fire adopted only in view of the circumstances 
that prevented the enemy’s defeat, rather than based on a need to recognize the other party as 
a partner in negotiations for a peaceful resolution of the conflict (FBIS-NES-92-159; Pipes 
and Stillman 1995; Transcript of Speech 1994). Arafat persistently endorsed a military 
struggle that should continue until an independent Palestinian state is established on the entire 
Territories. All of the above indicate that from Arafat’s point of view, the DOP was no more 
than a temporary tactic to achieve specific goals, and not a means to resolve the conflict 
peacefully.  
Conclusions 
Application of prenegotiation theory to the process leading to the signing of the DOP 
points to several conclusions that warrant consideration. First, progress of the prenegotiation 
in this case was characterized by the gradual elimination of alternatives. Apparently, the same 
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factors that drove the parties to the negotiation table also hastened them to make decisions 
without insisting on an exploration of the important issues, and pushed them to define the 
problem in a way that enabled them to sign the DOP agreement but that would not be 
constructive in a final-stage negotiation. Thus, both parties failed to ensure that the functions 
of the process were exhausted.  
The Israeli negotiators erred with the following mistakes: lack of in-depth exploration 
or examination of the Palestinian interests, disregard for the implications and costs of the 
agreement, employing constructive ambiguity and ignoring substantial disagreements, 
willingness to accept an agreement based on the lowest common denominator in the joint 
definition of the problem, restriction of the agenda and postponing discussions on disputed 
issues to the future, and, finally, conducting an incomplete exploration of mutuality in the 
process.  
On the Palestinian side, the two elements relating to the prenegotiation stage whose 
absence was most glaring were adequate mutuality and development of a sound base of 
popular Palestinian support for a process that would lead to the resolution of the conflict. 
Furthermore, Arafat’s strategic goals had not changed through the prenegotiation process. His 
agreement to a joint definition based on the lowest common denominator served his desire to 
reap the gains available at the moment while continuing to pursue his original goals.  
I have demonstrated through this study that the factors which motivated Rabin to 
consider negotiation with the PLO influenced both the manner in which the process was 
conducted and the timing of Israel’s agreement with the PLO. Ultimately, Rabin’s perception 
and image of his opponent changed to some extent. However, the factors that drove Arafat to 
participate in the process prevented any change in Arafat’s perception of his opponent or of 
the conflict. This context continued to cast a shadow on the parties' relationship and their 
subsequent discussions. The prenegotiation process is designed to serve as a transition period 
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that allows the parties to shift from adversarial to collaborative perceptions and behaviors. 
And in fact, Rabin became willing to accept his opponent as a partner to the future 
negotiations. Rabin’s image of his opponent changed as well.  Arafat, on the other hand, 
underwent a tactical change in his terms of agreement, while no substantial change took place 
in his perception of the conflict or the way to achieve his goals.  
Analysis of the factors that brought the parties to the decision to accept the DOP 
shows that Zartman’s ripeness theory – which underscores the conditions that may bring 
parties to the negotiating table by centring on the concept of mutually hurting stalemate in the 
parties’ relations – is not able to explain all factors affecting this specific case. Clearly, both 
parties held a perception of a mutually hurting stalemate. However, these perceptions failed 
to create intentions to negotiate toward a result that would serve both their interests.  
Apparently, the perceptions of threat and catastrophe that affected Arafat’s conduct in the 
process – perceptions that were external to the parties’ relationship – were reflected in the 
tactical changes in his perception and positions at the end of the prenegotiations. Rabin was 
similarly driven by a perceived impending threat that was external to Israeli-Palestinian 
relations – the threat of Iran. It was this perception of threat and hurting stalemate that led to 
the change in Rabin’s positions during this period. Moreover, from Rabin’s point of view, the 
internal ripeness element accelerated the process, determining its specific timing, as well as 
the identity of his negotiating partner.   
The prenegotiation stage described herein was intended to constitute the beginning of 
a process of problem solving, in which the parties would jointly address the problem based on 
mutual recognition and empathy. In reality, however, the Oslo prenegotiation process – 
particularly from the Palestinian perspective – was no more than a means of conflict 
management and adjustment to contemporary circumstances. 
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In this study, I have identified factors that might predict future developments; 
specifically, problems that undermine the subsequent negotiation process. Quite likely, these 
problems might have become evident even during the course of the prenegotiation process, 
had the participating actors been aware of the factors, functions, and perceptions discussed in 
this study rather than led by the wishful thinking that over time, adherence to a faulty process 
would prove beneficial and outweigh the costs of any concessions.  
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